Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Philosophy Honors Theses

Department of Philosophy

5-6-2012

Normative Dualism and the Definition of Art
Isabela Quevedo
Georgia State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_hontheses

Recommended Citation
Quevedo, Isabela, "Normative Dualism and the Definition of Art." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2012.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/2915234

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

NORMATIVE DUALISM AND THE DEFINITION OF ART

by

ISABELA QUEVEDO

Under the direction of Jessica Berry

ABSTRACT

Defining art has been one of philosophy of art’s biggest projects. However, no definition
offered has achieved to account for all objects we consider art. In this paper, I argue that
normative dualism, an unjustifiable Western prejudice for the mental, plays a big part in this
failure. The division between fine art and utilitarian and “low” art has been perpetuated because
the former is associated with the mental processes involved in its appreciation and, thus,
considered more valuable. Theories of art also tend to exclude production (a physical process),
concentrating mostly on the appreciation of art (a mental process). Ridding theory of the bias of
normative dualism, by abolishing the division that sets fine art apart as more valuable and
writing theory that takes art production into consideration, is the only way art theory will succeed
in accurately describing art objects.
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I. Introduction
Twentieth century aesthetics was full of failed definitions of art. For some theorists, this
failure has been a sign that the right definition has not been proposed. Some have criticized the
types of definitions used, proposing complex or disjunctive definitions instead. Others have
given up on describing art altogether. Others reject trying to find a definition, but they believe
finding an account is possible. In the 1950s, Morris Weitz applied Wittgenstein's criticism of
definitions—Wittgenstein says concepts like art, which he calls open, are based on family
resemblance, not on necessary and sufficient conditions—to definitions of art, saying the concept
of art cannot be defined, only described. This observation is insightful, as the objects we consider
to be art have become so diverse, no one trait can cover them all. Yet, Wittgensteinian accounts
have also been problematic, relying on paradigm art objects that end up begging the question. In
this paper, I will argue that the problems inherent to definitions are not the only reason aesthetics
has not succeeded in finding a satisfying description of art. A bias against the physical in favor of
the mental has perpetuated the myth that there is a real difference between “high” art and the
utilitarian arts,1 and has led philosophers to exclude considerations about how art is produced
from their theories about what art is, and to concentrate solely on its appreciation. This, I believe,
has been the biggest obstacle in finding a convincing account of art.
Art “with a capital 'A',” high art, the art of genius, the art for which we pay millions, has
never existed outside of theory. It is not a proper category of real objects. The idea that it is a
proper category is based on a prejudice that is as old as Western civilization the idea that the

1

Although my aim is to show that not only craft, but other utilitarian arts, such as illustration and industrial
design, are also art, throughout this paper, I will concentrate primarily on arguments that attack the art and craft
distinction. This is not a paper about the philosophy of language. The terms 'craft', 'design' and 'utilitarian art' are
just as contentious as the term 'art' itself. For this reason, I will not worry about these distinctions too much. Yet,
I would like to stress that this paper argues for the inclusion of craft, design and some “low” art into the idea of
art. I believe that the arguments contained in this paper are sufficient to cover most of these points.
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immaterial, the mental, the spiritual, the emotional, are more valuable than the material. The
division between art and “non-art” relies on our associating art with the mental processes
involved in its appreciation and “non-art” with things that seem to be incompatible with the
value of these mental activities. Craft is associated with the physical processes involved in its
utilization. “Low” art is associated with a general public audience, which in turn, is also
associated with the physical, as the working classes are associated with the physical labor they
tend to engage in. Design suffers from both of these associations, as design objects are both
utilized and mass produced/mass consumed. In an effort to exclude these other categories and
include only high art, early functionalist definitions of art were overly narrow, and later accounts
of art have become overly complex, overly contextual and counterintuitive.
Art theorist Arthur Danto goes so far as to admit that art is a theoretical category, saying
that “[i]t is the theory that takes [an artwork] up into the world of art, and keeps it from
collapsing into the real object which it is” (Danto 1964, 11).2 Yet, no account explains why it is
that the cognitive processes associated with art make it more valuable than “non-art” or why it is
important to keep artworks from collapsing into the real objects they are. What is more, no
account explains why we should still see the cognitive and the physical as different categories
that cannot overlap, given that we no longer recognize the metaphysical division of substances
into material and immaterial.
Similarly, the bias for the mental has led aestheticians to exclude art production from
their accounts of art. The relation between art and the processes of its appreciation is seen, in
some cases, as more important to art than the physical processes of its production, and in others,
as the only process relevant to the conception of art. Most functionalist definitions completely
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Danto, Arthur, “The Artworld,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 19 (1964): 571-84.
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ignore the artist and her intentions, while contextual definitions are audience theories, which
focus on the effect art has on the audience and take only the artist into consideration when
explaining her intentions to affect an audience. Accounts of art that try to include utilitarian nonWestern art focus on how an audience recognizes art across cultures, and not on the similarities
that exist among the processes of production of all of these objects. No justification is given for
concentrating on the appreciation of art, or for why no one has asked the artist what art means.
Art objects are artifacts, and as such, the intentions and processes involved in their production
should be as relevant as their appreciation.
I will begin my analysis by looking at a paper by Sally Markowitz, who examines the
influence the normative nature of dualism has had on the art and craft distinction. After this
examination, I will look at how this prejudice has permeated contemporary art theories, making
them inadequate. I will then examine Berys Gaut's cluster account, which has few detractors,
arguing that it fits craft and other utilitarian arts quite well, while being flexible enough to
include considerations about art production. I will follow by looking at an art theory by Nick
Zangwill, which concentrates on art production. This theory has many flaws, but it points out a
lot of important gaps in aesthetics and includes the artist, her intentions and her methods
prominently. I will close my paper by looking at some consequences of my account, such as the
possibility for good art and bad art and the place value has in art theory.

Normative Dualism
The claim that the distinction between art and craft is arbitrary is not new. Many have
argued that the distinction is elitist. Some criticize the divide because the work traditionally done
by women disproportionately falls under the heading ‘craft’. Others protest because the label
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tends to be applied to the work of people of color. Yet another group claims that it is the products
of the working classes that usually get relegated into this “second tier” category. The truth is that
work done by upper- and middle-class white men is disproportionately labeled 'art'. It is also true
that art is viewed as more valuable than craft. Yet, the mere fact that the divide has favored white
males does not mean it exists for this purpose.
In “The Distinction Between Art and Craft,” Sally Markowitz addresses the
misconception that the art and craft divide is explained by elitism.3 Markowitz points out that
although elitism is a real problem, accusations of elitism that accept the distinction do not
explain it, while the ones that reject the distinction oversimplify the issue. The distinction
between art and craft, as well as its elitism, rest on the idea of normative dualism. Dualism, a
theory of mind proposed by Descartes, is inherently normative. When separating the
metaphysical categories of the material and the immaterial, dualism ascribes more value to the
immaterial. Similarly, and not by coincidence, the distinction between art and craft is not equal;
more value is ascribed to art.
Markowitz begins by applying to craft objects two types of criteria, aesthetic and
semantic, commonly used to justify the classification of some objects as art. Claims of elitism
and the idea of normative dualism would not hold if these criteria turned out accurately to
describe only art objects. By applying them successfully to craft objects, Markowitz aims to
show that the criteria work only under an unjustified prejudice for the mental.
The aesthetic criterion is described as follows: what makes an object an art object is that
it has a certain type of aesthetic character. What counts as aesthetic character is not entirely clear,
but it is generally taken to mean beauty, evocativeness and form. Sometimes the idea goes
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beyond formal characteristics and includes the response people have to objects; sometimes the
intention to make something with aesthetic character is also taken into consideration. Markowitz
says that although the term 'aesthetic' has been disputed by some, we can agree it is widely
applied, and thus she takes it for granted. In trying to dispute the art/craft distinction, she wants
to avoid challenging or addressing any of the other controversies that exist in art theory.
Because craft is utilitarian, how far the aesthetic criterion applies to it depends on the
version of the criterion being employed. When aesthetic character is meant to pertain only to
formal qualities, then it can easily apply to craft. Craft has formal qualities, and even if strict
formalism is applied, one can argue that the formal elements of an object are inextricably linked
to its function. Whether it is the pouring ability of a pitcher or the ability a painting has to
represent, the function of an object explains its form. However, a challenge arises when we
consider the response aspect of the aesthetic criterion. Aesthetic response is taken to be a
cognitive process involving disinterested contemplation, and some see contemplation as
incompatible with physical actions. Markowitz says that the solution hinges on the rejection of
this last claim. Although forfeiting the idea of the aesthetic response or saying it has nothing to
do with contemplation are also possible solutions, both of these options seriously affect our
conception of art appreciation. Saying that physical engagement with an object is compatible
with contemplation solves the problem and has no such implications. We can contemplate the
aesthetic features of a pot, we can think about its colors or how beautiful its handle is, while
pouring tea out of a pot. Therefore, craft objects can meet the aesthetic criterion.
Markowitz uses Arthur Danto's definition of the semantic criterion. The semantic
criterion states that the semantic character, the possibility for interpretation, of an art object is
what stops it from being a run-of-the-mill object. Markowitz acknowledges that Danto might be
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offering a normative account of art, but even if Danto is only giving a picture of what he wishes
art were, this idea is so commonly applied that it merits scrutiny.
Craft is usually not interpreted. It can be beautiful, but pure beauty does not lend itself to
interpretation. Markowitz says that because craft is useful, we think it does not have to be
interpreted. Conversely, she says that we might have a need to interpret artworks because “we
don't know what else to do with them” (Markowitz 1994, 61). Yet, it is very easy to imagine a
world in which people routinely ascribe meaning to and interpret craft. Utility need not exclude
interpretation. A knife with allegorical animal carvings on its handle could be interpreted and
also used.
Markowitz says this view does not solve the problem, however. This possibility does not
prove that there is no division between art and craft, it only proves the contingency of the
division. Thus, Markowitz turns to another example that challenges the semantic criterion:
embroidery. Because embroidery is representational, traditionally depicting symbols of female
gender norms, it demands interpretation. This must mean semantic character is not all there is to
the semantic criterion. Art is associated with originality and individuality and the traditional roles
embroidery usually represents are seen as incompatible with personal expression and innovation.
The semantic criterion, were it not skewed to conform to prejudiced views, such as the ones that
relegate work done by females to craft, could pertain to craft.
The differences between art and craft do not depend only on what craft lacks, as
Markowitz points out. There are many practices in craft that art does not conform to.
Craftspeople have a preoccupation with material and craftsmanship: they respect them. Being
true to a material, exalting its qualities, never trying to make the material look like something
else, are all seen as signs of the sincerity and honesty of craft. For many craftspeople, craft
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preserves values art has neglected and, because of this, craft is held in high ethical regard.
Workmanship is appreciated for the same reason. Craftspeople feel objects, whether craft or art,
should be well made.
Self-expression is thought to overshadow function and interfere with the values craft tries
so hard to promote, making many craftspeople and craft collectors reject it. Yet, not all
craftspeople hold these values dear. Many are now trying to produce craft objects with deeper,
sometimes personal, meaning. Carl Borgeson makes ceramic pots with lids that cannot be
detached. By completely renouncing the utilitarian, Borgeson hopes to make a statement. An
artist's choice of title may also challenge the traditions of craft. “Apartheid Chair,” by Paul
Ludic, is a functional chair painted in different colors and with a chain-link fence as a back. The
chair's materials, in connection to its title, demand interpretation. The different colors represent
different ethnicities, while the chain link back evokes the true usage of chain-link fences, making
it a political statement. Interpretation makes these objects transcend their classification as mere
objects, and as this trend to make craft objects with semantic character continues, the division
between art and craft will become even harder to sustain.
The analysis demonstrates that the criteria only support the art/craft division when
processes that are purely cognitive are taken into account, and even then, it is suspect that the
craft objects the criteria apply to are still labeled as “mere” craft. Because the separation does not
depend on the objects alone, there must be a set of values and assumptions influencing the
criteria we use and how we apply it. Markowitz addresses three different arguments for the idea
that the division between art and craft exists due to elitism, aiming to show that none of the
arguments is completely successful. The first argument Markowitz looks at denies the existence
of the art/craft distinction by saying that art is the label for what the wealthy make and craft is

7

the label given to the work of the poor. Yet, there are problems with this assumption. Pointing out
an error in classification does not mean that the classification is wrong. Elitism can reside in the
type of distinction made, not the fact that the distinction is made. This is the premise of the
second argument Markowitz addresses. Some theorists say the divide itself and the criteria used
to distinguish art and craft are correct, but that objects have been misclassified due to sexism and
racism. Elitism has led the divide to be drawn so that only the work of white males is included in
the category ‘art’. Accepting this argument might motivate a relabeling of objects, but it would
not explain why we value art over craft. The third and last argument has a similar problem. This
argument also acknowledges the divide and the criteria, but it does not ask for reclassification; it
takes a separate-but-equal approach. Art and craft are separate, but both should be equally
valuable. Yet, this does not answer why we have valued art more until now. It also does not ask
why the distinction exists in the first place.
Using Alison Jaggar's idea of normative dualism, Markowitz explains the root of the art
and craft distinction. Although Descartes' metaphysical separation of the spiritual and the
physical is no longer taken seriously, its effects can still be felt. We readily classify things into
mental and physical categories, and what is more, we take the superiority of the mental for
granted. Somatophobia, the aversion to the physical, has had a huge influence and meaningful
consequences in many arenas of Western thought. For example, the fear of the physical has lead
groups with power to reduced the oppressed to their physical characteristics so that they can
deny their rationality and classify them as less than human. Markowitz correctly observes that,
similarly, somatophobia is responsible for the elitism that favors white men in art. Moreover,
somatophobia is the reason art is valued over craft. Art is associated with the mental, the
immaterial, while craft, being utilitarian, is physical. The aesthetic and semantic criteria both
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suffer from this bias. The aesthetic response is thought to lay only in contemplation, and
contemplation is seen as incompatible with the physical. The semantic criterion concentrates
only on the interpretation of an object, a mental process, so that utilitarian objects can be
excluded.
Markowitz's aim is to make us question why we value art over craft without questioning
the quality or workmanship put into the objects. She wants us to question why we value mental
processes over physical processes and the social implications this evaluation has. She feels that
understanding normative dualism is necessary for understanding why the art/craft distinction
exists and does not want to denounce it as illusory; instead, she says that “elitist or not, a
distinction is real enough if we make it, especially when it informs our social practices”
(Markowitz 1994, 69). But this is where Markowitz goes wrong. I agree with her analysis, and I
agree with her goals, but simply explaining something does not justify it. No distinction, even if
elitist, arbitrary or wrong, should be dismissed without analyzing its effects. We can denounce
something as illusory while still understanding its cause and its effects. When fighting racism
and sexism, defenders of the rights of women and blacks understood the social implications of a
divide that, based in normative dualism, classified women and people with dark skin as less than
human. Activists understood the elitism behind this divide while denouncing it as illusory. And
we can analyze the causes behind the art/craft division, examine its consequences and still say it
is illusory, as we should. If this division has relevant social consequences, the fact that it is
unjustifiable should make denouncing it as illusory a top priority.
The problem lies in the fact that showing that categorization is based on an unjustified
assumption does not necessarily make it a mistake. One can identify something correctly even if
one's reasons are completely wrong. Yet, there are two very significant reasons supporting the
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idea that the art and craft distinction is not only unjustified but unjustifiable. The first is that, so
far, definitions of art have failed to create conceptions of art that account for all art objects. I will
address this point in the next section. The second is that the bias of normative dualism is present
not only in the art and craft distinction, but in whole of the field of aesthetics. The idea of art in
Western culture, its value and its practices, all stem from a prejudice for the mental that can be
traced back to the origins of Western thought.
Descartes' normative dualism is based on the Greek and Christian divisions of the
material and immaterial. Christians separate the body from the soul, associating the body with
sin. The Greeks separated mental from physical work, preferring the first.4 This influenced what
little art theory they had: poetry theory. Greek poetry theory, in turn, was the basis for art theory
in the eighteenth century. This means our conception of art, which we assume is an accurate
description of the objects and their value, is based on a millenary, unjustified bias. Justifying the
preference for the mental would vindicate the art and craft divide and our assumptions about the
value of art. However, considering that most of us no longer accept the separation of the material
and the immaterial, it seems unreasonable to try to justify a meaningful preference for the latter.
Restructuring theory to get rid of the bias, then, is the rational option.

Evaluating Definitions of Art
The art/craft division is not the only way in which normative dualism has affected art
theory. The bias, as we have seen, is also tied to sexism, racism and classism, which has led to
the exclusion of certain objects and performances from the category 'art'. I will address how this
4

In his study of the history of the fine arts as a group from the Ancient Greeks to the eighteenth century, Paul
Kristeller discusses the way the Greeks viewed visual art. He quotes certain instances in which philosophers
would follow praise for painters or sculptors by saying they would still rather be thinkers than get mixed with
manual labor. See Kristeller, Paul Oskar, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics
(I),” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Oct., 1951): 500-3.
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has affected the classification of certain films, music, and even paintings later on in my paper.
Another way in which normative dualism has affected theory is the exclusion of art production
from accounts of art. Theorists have not bothered asking the artist what art is. They rarely
consider the intentions or processes involved in art production when describing art objects, and
the few philosophers who do take this into account do so by stressing the importance the
experience of the audience has for the artist. I will look at the analyses Morris Weitz, Robert
Stecker and Stephen Davies have made of the three types of art definitions: functional,
institutional and historical (these last two are contextual). I will use these analyses to illustrate
how these definitions are supposed to work, why theorists think that they have failed, and how
normative dualism has affected them.
Morris Weitz's article, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” is one of the most important
works in aesthetics, as it challenged definitions by pointing out their weaknesses.5 Written in
1956, this article shifted the focus of aesthetics away from the essentialist definitions of the early
twentieth century and contemporary definitions that no longer seek necessary and sufficient
conditions (Stecker, 45).6 Highly influenced by Wittgenstein, Weitz argues that art is an open
concept, that is, a concept lacking necessary and sufficient conditions. Weitz stresses that all
definitions formulated until then claimed to have picked the one and only essential trait of art,
also saying the all other definitions were wrong. Formalism picked formal properties as the
essence of art. Emotionalism said that art's sole aim was to convey emotion. Intuitionism viewed
art as a spiritual activity. There are several more essentialist definitions, but it is not necessary to
examine them as they all suffer from the same problem; they are all too narrow. All of these traits

5
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Weitz, Morris, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 15, No. 1
(Sep., 1956), 27-35.
Stecker, Robert, “Is It Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?” in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noel Carroll
(Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 45.
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are part of art, and picking any single one as essential gives an incomplete account of what art is.
According to Weitz, aesthetics should attempt to describe the concept of art, not create a
theory of art. Wittgenstein's family resemblance, a theory that states we classify objects by
finding similarities between objects, not by finding necessary and sufficient conditions, is Weitz's
proposed method. Open concepts, such as art, and the objects that fall under them, only have a
group of related similarities that binds them together. Not all objects have all the similarities, but
each has enough to be seen as part of the group. Trying to find essential traits and necessary and
sufficient conditions is futile for open concepts is futile, as only closed concepts, like
mathematics and logic, have them.
Robert Stecker has a similar complaint about essentialist definitions.7 Stecker refers to
these definitions as functionalist definitions because they all stress a function served by art that is
thought to be valuable. Stecker considers that Weitz's critique of essentialism is important, as it
has promoted an account of art that is open to modification. Being disjunctive, that is, being
made up of several features which are not independently necessary, is what is required of a good
definition of art. Stecker claims all good contemporary definitions are disjunctive, which is
tantamount to saying early twentieth-century functionalist definitions were bad definitions
because they were too narrow and failed to take certain important features of art into account.
Both Morris and Stecker give compelling evidence that there is something inherently
wrong with definitions that seek necessary and sufficient conditions. But, aside from the
problems definitions have, normative dualism is clearly at work here. Formalism relates to
Markowitz's idea of contemplative admiration of aesthetic properties. Intuitionism directly states
that art is about the spiritual, the immaterial. Expressionism is about art as a medium for the
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expression of emotion, a mental process. These traits are also clearly geared towards the mental
processes of the viewer, concentrating more on the appreciation of art more than its production.
Any talk of the artist's intention views it as geared towards an audience, which is not surprising,
as these definitions were written from the point of view of viewers of art. The philosophers
behind these theories did not take the artist into consideration when picking an essence for art,
and Weitz's concern that these are normative definitions is not unfounded. It is likely that these
candidates for the essence of art were based on what these philosophers thought the traits of art
should be, not what traits art objects actually possess.
Contemporary definitions, as pointed out above, have ceased to look for necessary and
sufficient conditions. Most current definitions belong to functionalism (although in a new form
that looks only for conditions that are sufficient but not required), contextual theories (such as
institutionalist and historical theories), or hybrids of the three.8 Institutional definitions depend
on the institution of art or the artworld to explain the art status of objects. Historical theories link
the way present art objects are treated by the artworld to the way other objects that are
considered art have been treated in the past. The major objection against these definitions, an
objection that has been made by Berys Gaut, Robert Stecker, Stephen Davies and Peg Zeglin
Brand, among others, is that they fail to take into account the art that exists outside of the context
of the Western artworld. I will now look at two shapes this objection can take.
In “Non-Western Art and Art's Definition,” Stephen Davies explains why he thinks nonWestern cultures have art, posing arguments against theories that say they do not, and then
explaining how this affects existing theories of art.9 Addressing this last point, Davies
demonstrates that contextual theories have a hard time accommodating non-Western art. George
8
9

Stecker, 45-8.
Davies, Stephen, “Non-Western Art and Art's Definition,” in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noel Carroll (Madison,
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Dickie's institutional theory says that an object is art if and only if it is an artifact presented as a
candidate for aesthetic appreciation to an audience in the institutional artworld, which is the
complex set of social relations in which art occurs. Some cultures outside of the West, such as
Japan and China, have institutionalized professional art, but for the most part, art outside of the
West occurs in informal settings. The institutional theory, therefore, cannot properly account for
non-Western art. Jerrold Levinson's historical theory states that for an object to be artwork, it
must be regarded in the same way part artwork have been regarded. Because it allows for
historical narratives within different cultures, it seems to account for Non-Western art, but it does
not explain how we can recognize different historical traditions of art cross-culturally. Davies’
main argument in favor of seeing certain objects in other cultures as art, and not dismissing this
concept as a Western phenomenon, is the fact that we can recognize art cross-culturally, even
without being acquainted with the customs and mores of these cultures. If art were art only in
virtue of its placement within a culture's historical tradition, we would have no way of
recognizing these objects as art unless we were familiar with the culture. Thus, historical
definitions, too, fail successfully to account for non-Western art.
Gaut and Stecker have a slightly different form of this criticism. In his essay, “Is It
Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?,” Stecker argues that although current definitions of art are
said to share no common ground, all of the ones that work are, in fact, disjunctive definitions.10
To show this is true, Stecker analyzes how well functionalist, institutionalist and historical
theories fare, both as simple and as disjunctive definitions. Stecker says that both contextual
definitions cannot account for “first art.” The first artwork created within a culture cannot be
account for by these theories, as there was no artworld for it to be embedded in and no previous
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Stecker, Robert, “Is It Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?” in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noel Carroll
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art to which it could be related. Gaut's problem is similar, although it also relates to Davies's
objection.11 These theories have no way of accounting for art that exists outside of the proposed
context, for example, in the case of alien artifacts that look like artworks found on a different
planet.
The inclusion of non-Western art is important to the project of removing the bias of
normative dualism from art theory, as much of it is utilitarian. One of the biggest problems
theorists have with non-Western art is its utility. A bias against craft made in the West has led
some theorists to ignore the utility of these objects when classifying them as art, creating a
double-standard according to which craft is not art because of its utility, and non-Western art is
art despite of it. As noted by Davies, many anthropologists want to deny that non-Western
cultures have art namely because of its utility and a lack of differentiation between art and craft. I
agree with Davies’ criticism, but I would also like to stress that the difference between the
Western and non-Western conceptions of art only stands when the bias of normative dualism is at
work. If the West were to consider craft, design and “low” art, then our concept of art would be
similar to that which exists outside of the West. Thus, considering non-Western art, utility and
all, as art, opens the door for Western forms of utilitarian art to be considered art as well.
Conversely, if we are to remove the bias of normative dualism from the Western tradition of art,
we would no longer have to engage in the debate of whether people outside the West have art.
Aside from their problem with accounting for art outside of the Western tradition,
contextual definitions are also clearly biased towards the mental. These definitions are
completely dependent on the conceptual nature of art. Art-hood does not lie in the object or its
production, it lies in a decision or on a conceptual precedent, and especially, on its audience.
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Creating a piece of art, on this view, has to do solely with the intent of artists to create a specific
appreciation experience or on authoritative members of the audience, such as critics and art
historians, picking out objects as art based on their experiences of them. Art is so far removed
from the physical on the contextualist account that it seems to exist only in the minds of those
who already understand art objects as art.12
Adapting these definitions to include utilitarian or mass produced objects is possible if
their art-hood is conferred by the institution or they are properly connected to existing art
objects. Yet, this seems highly unlikely, especially because Weitz's concern about the normative
nature of definitions is also at play here. Contemporary definitions might be descriptive, as they
give a very good explanation of how the institution of art functions. In practice, critics,
historians, theories, artists and collectors all follow the practices described by contextual
theories. However, these definitions are not describing art objects accurately; they are not
accounts of what art really is. The descriptions given by these definitions are all normative
because they are placing value on objects that are considered “art” while stripping other, non-art
objects of this value. They are all still accounts of what theorists think art should be, not what it
is. This means that as long as theorists see utilitarian objects as less valuable, they will be
reluctant to include them in their theories. And even if these theories included utilitarian objects,
contextual definitions would fail to account for art production. Again, it seems like restructuring
theory is the only option.
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Art Production
The argument presented by Markowitz makes a good case for utilitarian art, but it is
working only from the perspective of art consumption. It could turn out to be that, for reasons
separate from normative dualism, only art appreciation should be considered when creating a
successful account of art. If definitions of art are defective not only because they exclude
physical utilization from theory, but also because they exclude art production from theory, then a
separate argument must be made in order to defend the claim that we must consider art
production in addition to consumption. I will now give now give three separate reasons in favor
of a theory of art that includes production.
It could be argued that art theory must be written from the perspective of art appreciation
because this process is universal, while art production is experienced only by artists. Therefore,
art production is not fully understood by most people and theory must be written from the
universal perspective. However, this criticism could apply only if the ideas of genius and creative
impulse as “divine inspiration” were true. Only if the creative process is an indescribable
mystery would this be true. The idea, attributed to Kant, that art is the product of genius is an
influential one in philosophy of art.13 Many believe that genius is necessary for art production,
and that, as such, only those born with this innate artistic talent can produce art.
The problem is that the idea that art requires genius it is a controversial one (and, I
believe, an implausible one, too). Bradley Murray says that Kant is being misread by
philosophers and that he never said genius was necessary for art production, only that we needed
to pretend nature, working through genius, was the true author for art in order to achieve
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disinterested contemplation of the aesthetic properties of art. Moreover, the idea of genius did
not arise until the eighteenth century.14 As I mentioned earlier, the Greeks associated poetry only
with cognitive processes, while the visual arts were seen as physical labor. During the
Renaissance, and even later, most artists worked in workshops where apprentices trained under
an artist, learning the process of making artworks and even doing a lot of the work for their
master. Academies of art have existed since the late Renaissance, and even today, most art
schools teach the techniques of art production. Having been an art student for years myself, I
know that it is practice and hard work that make for truly exceptional art, regardless of the level
of innate talent.
Many theorists have used genius as an explanation for the technical skilled displayed in
certain artworks; as an explanation for the existence of certain artworks. However, the idea of
genius is not an explanation of art production; genius is actually incompatible with the
explanation of production processes. The concept of ‘genius’ is usually taken to imply that there
is some inexplicable natural process that is responsible for art. The idea of genius in art implies
that creativity is a mystery, an impulse the artist cannot help or control. But to say that art is
something that just happens, a drive the artist cannot control, is to take the artist out of the
equation. Besides, the idea of genius has not always and is not always associated with art
production.
It is true that individuals with truly exceptional talent exist. However, this is true of most
areas of human endeavor. Physical theories sometimes come from exceptional individuals like
Einstein, but we do not think it is necessary to be a genius to be a physicist or to make an
important discovery in this area. Similarly, we should not expect every artist to be a genius. As
14
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Stephen Davies and Dennis Dutton point out, art is a universal practice, it exists in all cultures. In
many cultures, those who create art are seen as skilled artisans who have acquired their
competence through practice, not by nature. As children, we all create art. When 'art' is taken a
value-neutral term, the idea that we all have the ability to produce art, albeit to different degrees,
is a possibility. If art production is a universal endeavor, and it seems to be, then art production
could not be an unintelligible process.
A second reason why it is crucial for theorists to take production into consideration is that
artists might provide a valuable source of information about the nature of art. It could be that the
only thing all art objects had in common was the process behind their creation. It must be granted
that some artists have been indoctrinated by art theory, they define their work and the value of
their work based on what the institution finds valuable. Yet, even in cases where the artists'
conceptions of art are no different from the conceptions of other members of the artworld, they
can provide descriptions of their processes of production. Both the cognitive and physical
processes involved in art production could be sources of similarities, or perhaps further
differences that prove me wrong, between art and non-art objects. Artists could also eventually
be the subjects of neurological research. Studying the brain and creativity might be key to
understanding art, its production and its appreciation.
The last reason for favoring the inclusion of art production in art theory is that we should
explain the rationality of art activities, a very good point made by Nick Zangwill in his book
Aesthetic Creation.15 In this book, Zangwill argues for a production-based theory of art. As will
me demonstrated in the discussion below, Zangwill's arguments in favor of his theory are hardly
convincing, and his characterization of his theory as novel and revolutionary are far from
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accurate. Yet, there are still some important lessons to be learned from his theory of aesthetic
creation. For example, Zangwill believes that a good theory of art should not explain only what
the concept of art means, but that it should make art activities intelligible. If we engage in art
production, art consumption and art preservation, there must be a reason for it. Unless these
activities are valuable, it would be irrational for people to spend so much time, effort and money
creating art and engaging in them.
Many philosophers feel that any talk of value should be left out of art theory. Both
Markowitz and Weitz worry about the normative nature of some definitions. George Dickie says
that 'art' should be a neutral term so that we can allow for good and bad art.16 Zangwill says that
separating the description and the value of art is impossible, as part of describing art is
explaining why people engage in art activities. What is more, Zangwill says that Dickie is wrong
in thinking that all theories that explain the value of art would not allow for the possibility of bad
art.
Zangwill's theory of aesthetic creation successfully proves this point. Because it is
centered on the production of art, the intentions of the artist are taken into consideration before
any talk of appreciation comes into play. Zangwill believes that art must be created with the
intention of producing an object that has aesthetic properties, and that because of this, there is
room for failure and bad art. Something may be art without its producer having intended it to be
so, and intentions can be realized with varying degrees of success.
I agree with Zangwill's description of art production and appreciation, as well as with
most of the extension of his account. He explains that the artist has certain intentions she wants
to achieve, but that these intentions can be adjusted during the process of creating an artwork. He
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allows for different levels of success and for accidental properties to be part of the finished work.
He stresses that, as artifacts, there must be a function to art. He allows for the appropriation of
natural objects and other artifacts as art. He says artists do not always create with an audience in
mind and stresses that the act of artistic creation is pleasurable in and of itself. He rejects purely
sociological, that is, contextual, definitions of art and says that the properties of the objects
matter as much as the context they are created in. He allows utilitarian art and even everyday
activities, such as doodling, to fit the theory.
Yet, Zangwill thinks aesthetic properties are essential to art. He explains the pleasure of
art production in terms of the pleasure derived from creating aesthetic properties, because these
properties are valuable. He says that an artist's intentions must be to create aesthetic properties in
an object. He says that the appreciation of art is also due to the pleasure aesthetic properties
induce. Although he says his theory is a new way of looking at art, beyond putting production
into the equation, his theory is no different than old-fashioned aesthetic theories. As the
discussion about functionalist definitions above demonstrates, essentialist definitions are too
narrow; in Zangwill’s case, most avant garde art is excluded prima facie.
The problems do not stop there. Although he considers aesthetic properties to be essential
to all art, Zangwill says that other properties, social, economic and semantic, can be essential to
individual artworks. As I will demonstrate in the next section, if there is a description of art that
can account for all of these properties without excluding any artworks, and without resorting to
obsolete talk of essences, that will be the more desirable theory.17 Zangwill also never includes a
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convincing argument in his book explaining what aesthetic properties are, why artworks have
them and why they are valuable. He briefly mentions the link between aesthetic properties and
value in the last few paragraphs of the book, but by then, it does little to support his theory.
Zangwill also claims that aesthetic properties are dependent and supervenient on the nonaesthetic properties of works, but never explains why, and he does not defend these relations
either, although he admits that they are problematic. He also makes broad, uncharitable
generalizations about sociological theories of art, accusing all of their proponents of the some/all
fallacy and assuming that because not all artworks can be explained in terms of aesthetic
properties, then none can be.
In short, although it is a position that includes and even privileges art production, while
still explaining art appreciation, Zangwill's artistic creation is not a good candidate for a theory
of art. But this does not mean it is not without value. This theory asks the right questions. What
is art? Why do we create art? Why do we appreciate it? This theory concentrates on all aspects of
the art process. This theory allows for the physical and mental appreciation of art. It includes
“high” art, craft, design, “low” art and everyday activities. Yet, although the support for this
theory is not compelling enough, even if it does not suffer from the bias of normative dualism.
This is not the correct way to restructure theory.

The Cluster Account
Restructuring theory might sound like a daunting task. We might worry that abolishing
the art/craft distinction or the bias of normative dualism might undermine other aesthetic
theories. Yet, this task is not nearly as monumental as it seems, nor do we have to give up all
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areas of art theory to purge the prejudice. Although some theories concentrate solely on the
cognitive processes involved in the production and appreciation of art, this does not mean these
theories need to be scrapped. Many theories already correctly explain the characteristics of
certain objects; others point to what the institution of art values. Even while they rest on the bias,
some theories simply need to reassess the value they ascribe to art objects; others need to
acknowledge that they are not describing the objects themselves, but how we treat them. More
importantly, the efforts to create a successful account of art have inadvertently been working
towards discarding the bias of normative dualism already. Though I disagree with many aspects
of Zangwill's theory, it is proof that existing theories are compatible with the inclusion of “nonart” and art production. Yet, I think the rejection of essentialist definitions and a shift towards
cluster accounts of art has proven more beneficial to aesthetics. This approach rids theory of the
need to demonstrate the value of one criterion over another, allowing for many different criteria
to be considered as important to art. I will now discuss the benefits of cluster accounts.
Cluster accounts provide a successful classification system for art objects by employing
not a fixed definition but, instead, a list of characteristics that all objects that fall under a
category should have. Yet, unlike Weitz’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches, cluster accounts reject
the idea of having a paradigm object that determines resemblance. Berys Gaut's account of art is
the paradigm example of the cluster account: not only does it carefully delineate the form a
cluster account should take, but it has been so successful as to have few challengers.18 Gaut's list
of characteristics for art has three important features. First, the characteristics on the list are
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jointly sufficient to make an object art; that is, the conjunction of a group of them is sufficient
safely for us to say an object is art. Second, there is no single characteristic on the list that is
necessary; that is, no one characteristic must be present in an object for it to be considered art.
Third, these characteristics are disjunctively necessary. That is to say, possessing only one of the
characteristics does not make an object art; an art object must display two or more of the
characteristics on the list.
It is important to note that Gaut's account depends on its form and not on the content of
his list. Because the list is open to the expansion and replacement of its criteria, the content of
cluster accounts is not fixed. Yet, Gaut does suggest a ten-point list of characteristics for art
objects: Objects that (1) have aesthetic properties such as beauty and grace, (2) express emotion,
(3) challenge the status quo and the intellect, (4) have formal coherence and complexity, (5)
convey meaning beyond the obvious, (6) are the product of an individual point of view, (7)
display originality, imagination and creativity, (8) require high degree of skill to produce, (9) are
an example of an accepted art form or (10) have been produced with the intention of making art,
are art objects (Gaut 2000, 28). Gaut acknowledges that these ten specific characteristics could
be incomplete or open to revision, but his successful application of them to several accepted art
objects seems to indicate that they are a good starting point.
Gaut's account is promising because of how successful it has been at describing art
objects. For instance, he explains how the cluster account can successfully capture Picasso’s Les
Demoiselles d'Avignon, Egyptian art, Buñuel and Dali's Un Chien Andalou, folk art and an ugly
nineteenth-century painting. Gaut's list of characteristics is also promising because it includes
both cognitive and physical considerations and is open to revision. I will now argue for the claim
that any successful account of art will inevitably describe craft and other utilitarian arts as well.
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by applying Gaut's list of characteristics to some objects.
I will begin by using one of Markowitz's examples of an object that straddles the
boundary between art and craft: one of Borgeson's non-functional pots. Following Markowitz's
description, the pot meets six out of ten of the criteria mentioned above. Its pleasant color
scheme and form meet characteristics one and four (aesthetic properties and formal coherence).
The idea of the non-functioning lid meets points three (challenge to the status quo), six (an
individual point of view), and seven (display of originality). Because the object displays mastery
of pottery technique, it meets point eight. Borgeson's pot fits Gaut's cluster account.
Yet, the case of a craft object that fits Gaut's account may succeed in showing only that
that particular object was art, and not craft, all along. If the account is to include the whole of
craft, the account must apply successfully to an object that is not a borderline case, an object that
most theorists would reject as art, such as a blown glass vase. Blown glass vases are generally
considered beautiful, so they meet point one. Some of them have very complex forms, which
display both formal complexity (point four), and mastery of technique (point eight). Making a
particularly complex form that requires the development of new techniques to work the glass is a
display of originality and creativity, so a glass vase can also satisfy point seven.
The fact that the vase meets only four of the criteria on the list is a cause for concern. For
example, Gaut suggests that a philosophy paper would meet points three, four, five and seven,
and thus would provide an example of something that meets the requirements on the list but is
not art. But as Gaut admits, a problem with this account is that there is no way of knowing how
many or which characteristics from the list are required to show an object is art. It seems we
have to appeal to our intuitions to apply the account. For example, the similarities between an
unremarkable student painting that meets only requirements one, four, nine and ten and a blown
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glass vase intuitively seem to be greater than those between the painting and the philosophy
paper. Yet, even if our intuition is correct, intuition does not justify anything.
Therefore, a better approach would be to find a way to verbalize and incorporate this
intuition into the account. I would like to propose a new feature for cluster accounts (I would like
to stress that I do not mean a new characteristic for the list) that could be added to Gaut's three
that would not only give more weight to the idea that craft fits the account, but would explain
why the painting does and the philosophy paper does not. All four characteristics met by the
philosophy paper belong to the ideas in it, not to the object itself. The paper and the characters
printed on the paper have nothing to do with the philosophy paper’s originality, the challenges it
poses to the intellect or even the complexity and coherence of its form. On the other hand, both
the student painting and the blown glass vase have characteristics that pertain to both the ideas
they represent as well as the objects themselves. Even in cases of conceptual art, the physical
object or performance is required to convey the message; it is a necessary part of the statement
being made. Unlike Berys Gaut's “'Art' as a Cluster Concept,” which would be the same thing
whether it was read in print or on the pixels of a screen, Marcel Duchamp's Fountain would be a
completely different piece, with a different impact, had a sink been used instead of a urinal.
Thus, in addition to the cluster account’s requirement that its proposed characteristics be jointly
sufficient and disjunctively necessary for “arthood,” it must also require that these joint
characteristics pertain to the object itself and to the cognitive and physical processes involved in
its production and appreciation.
Adding this feature is important not only because it appeases some worries that may arise
by its inclusiveness, but also because it stresses the rejection of normative dualism. The idea that
art exists only because of the relationship these objects have to theory, to ideas, to cognitive
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processes is unjustifiable. The physicality of art objects is as important to their being art objects
as the cognitive processes involved in their production and appreciation. The same goes for craft,
and therefore, we should not divide these objects into separate categories. The flexibility of this
account also allows for requirements pertaining to art production, beyond the artist's intentions,
which are already part of the list, to be added in the future.

Bad Art, Good Art and the Place of Value in Art Theory
Removing the bias of normative dualism and the art/craft distinction from aesthetics has a
couple of consequences that might seem undesirable to a few philosophers. Some might worry
that such an inclusive account would end up including any man-made object. However, as I will
demonstrate below, this worry is unfounded and only a problem for those with elitist views—
whether these views stem from normative dualism or another bias. A second concern the account
might raise is that its inclusiveness allows for good art and bad art, which some theorists might
not want. Going back to Zangwill's discussion of art and its value, I will explain why not only is
it desirable to explain the rationality of engaging in art activities, but necessary under a theory
that is free of the bias of normative dualism.
I will begin with the first worry: my account is so inclusive that all artifacts end up being
art. Prima facie, it seems like this would be true, as under the cluster account, a pencil that meets
the requirements could be art. Plumbing that meets the requirements could be art, whether it is
Duchamp's Fountain or a particularly aesthetically appealing faucet. A plastic bag could be art.
However, I would like to stress that this is only if the object meets the requirements of the cluster
account. This means that an object of any type, whether it is a mural or a utility box, can be art.
However, this does not mean that any one type of object will always be art. An appropriated
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yellow No. 2 pencil, sitting on a pedestal in a gallery, could be art. A giant pencil could be art.
But the type ‘pencil’ is not art, although tokens of the type may be. A chewed up pencil, sitting in
the corner of a second grade classroom is not art. Picasso's Guernica is art. A self-portrait by
Rembrandt is art. The painting of a rabbit I made when I was five is art. But a canvas used to
clean paintbrushes and covered in paintmarks is not art.
This can be troubling to some. Accepting craft as art is relatively easy: these objects are
unique and handmade by craftspeople who adhere to good technique and have a personal
relationship with the product. Yet, most people—theorists, members the artworld and the general
public—tend to reject mass produced objects as art. But I do not see a way to justify this. For one
thing, being an accepted art form has never been seriously considered as a necessary condition
for being art. More importantly, excluding mass produced objects from art usually hinges on the
biased idea that art is inherently valuable, and that, therefore, non-unique, mass produced objects
can not be art. Mass production is associated with mass consumption of a product, and this is
seen as incompatible with the value art has. Anyone can have one, at any time, making the object
less valuable.
This prejudice is also used against the entertainment industry and “low” art.19 It is rare
that popular music and movies are considered art. But just as it is unjustified to think an
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established art form is required for art status, it is unjustified to think a genre within an art form
is required for art status. I see no good reason to say all auteur films are art, while all action or
horror films are not. The reason Ingmar Bergman's films seem to be art and Jean Claude Van
Damme's filmography does not lies in how well they fit a good account of art, such as the cluster
account. Yet, if we were to find out that the director of a Jean Claude Van Damme film intended
for it to be art, then we would have to consider it art. After all, it is part of an accepted art form
and it has aesthetic properties, and these points of the cluster account pertain to both the object
and the processes involved in its appreciation and its production. This idea might be opposed by
many, but only if they think that there is no such thing as bad art.
In a discussion about art and censorship, Donald W. Crawford points out that the “art for
art's sake” idea of art and touting the value of art, whether it lies in promoting the value of
aesthetic properties or creativity, has led people to think art is above moral judgment.20 Similarly,
under normative dualism, equating art with the mental processes involved in its appreciation has
led some theorists to think that art is inherently good, that the idea of bad art is a contradiction.
In this sense, Dickie did have a point when he said 'art' should be a neutral term.
As I said above, I agree with Nick Zangwill that art theory must explain why art is
worthwhile, why it is reasonable for us to engage in art production and art appreciation. This is
not incompatible with there being good art and bad art, and explaining the rationality of art
activity does not make art a normative. Yet, I do not agree with his explanation for the value of
art. It is narrow and leaves out many considerations.
As pointed out by Zangwill, the production of art is pleasurable to the artist. Zangwill
thinks this pleasure stems from creating aesthetic properties, which he thinks are valuable.

20

Crawford, Donald W. “Can Disputes Over Censorship Be Resolved?” Ethics. Vol. 78, No. 2 (Jan., 1968): 93-4.

29

However, I do not see why the activity of artistic creation cannot be pleasurable without relying
on aesthetic properties. We can get pleasure from creating aesthetic properties, but we can also
get pleasure from endowing an object with special meaning, from creating a piece that
challenges the status quo, a piece that spreads an important social message, or even in creating an
artwork because it will help us pay the bills. Artistic creation might even be pleasurable for its
own sake, regardless of what the final product contains or expresses. The reason why artistic
creation is pleasurable is irrelevant. What matters is that artistic creation is pleasurable to most
artists, and, therefore, it is valuable to them.
Zangwill uses the pleasure found in creating and appreciating the aesthetic properties of
art as a bridge between the value of art production, the value of art consumption and the value of
art preservation. However, there is no important reason why the values of art production,
consumption and preservation should be the same.21 The fact that both of these activities center
on the same objects does not mean that our reasons for engaging in them must be the same.
Moreover, there is no reason why art should be valuable for only one reason. Take the Mona
Lisa. It was rational for Leonardo Da Vinci to paint this work for several reasons. He was getting
paid for it. He probably enjoyed the process of art production (regardless of the reason). He
could have been teaching an apprentice how to paint a portrait successfully. And a viewer’s
appreciation of the Mona Lisa is rational, but for other reasons. The viewer can appreciate the
subtle beauty of its brush strokes, or she can be impressed with Da Vinci's mastery of
atmospheric perspective. While these same reasons could explain why it is rational to want to
conserve the work, they need not; and there may be other reasons that do that work.. For
example, it is important to conserve the Mona Lisa because of its popularity and the historical
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value it has gained. It would be absurd to think that this was among the reasons Da Vinci created
the painting, and most people's appreciation of it are independent of this.
Art activities can be rationally explained independently of each other. For this reason, we
can explain the value of art as whole, as a branch of human endeavor, without explaining the
value of independent artworks. We can discuss why people think art activities are rational
without making 'art' a normative term. Philosophers seem to ignore the fact that simply because
art as an activity is worthwhile, this does not mean that all artworks should be. Theories that
concentrate wholly or primarily on art appreciation suffer from this myopia.
Seeing that not all artworks are worthwhile, although art as a whole is, is easy if we
consider all art activities when creating an account of art. If it is true that art production is
pleasurable to the artist, this would make art production rational and worthwhile. Therefore, art,
as an endeavor, is valuable because its creation is valuable. Art objects do not always meet the
artist's intentions, however, as Zangwill points out. So, even if an artist intended to make a
beautiful painting in order to educate his community about the evils of American interventionism
overseas, this does not mean that the painting will be beautiful or that it will successfully depict
American interventionism in a negative light (and even if it did, this does not mean his message
is true or worthwhile). Moreover, the artist could have no intention of producing anything of
either visual or theoretical value. Yet, it is the fact that an art object has visually or theoretically
valuable properties that makes it worthwhile to appreciate. Art consumption is justified by the
beauty of a piece, or by its intellectual or even monetary value, regardless of what the artist’s
intentions were. The value of independent artworks, then, is completely separate from the value
of art as whole. There can be bad art, although, art, as a whole, is an important and worthwhile
branch of human endeavor.
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Therefore, the value of art has a place in art theory without making the term 'art'
normative. An inclusive account of art, such as mine, avoids two mistakes normative dualism has
led theorists to make, the unjustified exclusion of objects based on a prejudice for their class or
genre and the rejection of the idea of bad art. Bad art is a necessary part of a theory that explains
the rationality behind art activities, the actual properties objects have and that correctly classifies
objects as art. A last clarification I would like to make is that satisfying more or fewer of Gaut's
cluster account criteria cannot be used to determine whether art is good or not. Simply because a
work meets all points on the list, this does not mean it does it exceptionally well or that it is
valuable. Whether it is of your liking or not, Duchamp's Fountain has been an incredibly
influential, and thus valuable, piece of art. It is good art not because it meets all of the
requirements on Gaut's list, but because it meets some of them, challenging the intellect and the
status quo, and expressing originality, incredibly well.

Conclusion
The bias of normative dualism has led to the separation of “high” art from craft, design
and “low” art, a division that is unjustifiable. It has led to the exclusion of art production from art
theory, which has given us an incomplete picture of what art really is. It has made many theorists
think that bad art is an oxymoron, and thus, to the misclassification of many objects. This bias is
so entrenched in Western thought that it has affected all of art theory. The quest of twentiethcentury aesthetics failed to describe art time and time again. Part of this failure can be attributed
to the fact that art objects, being so diverse, have no necessary and sufficient conditions that
apply to all of them. Yet, this problem, which arises when definitions are applied to open
concepts that lack independently necessary and sufficient conditions, is not the only reason
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behind this failure. Even accounts rejecting essential features have not managed to include all of
the objects we want to consider art. The attempts to maintain the division between art and “nonart” are also part of the reason accounts of art have failed.
As I have tried to show by applying Berys Gaut's cluster account, which is successful in
describing art objects, to craft, a good description of art will also describe utilitarian art and
“low” art. Art and so called “non-art” share not only aesthetic characteristics, but also production
and appreciation traits. Unlike other artifacts, it is both the cognitive processes involved in their
production and appreciation and the physical characteristics of the objects themselves that make
them what they are. Therefore, ridding theory of the bias of normative dualism and the arbitrary
art/craft division is the first step to creating an account of art that actually works.
Including production is the next step to creating a theory that is free of the prejudice for
the mental and that accurately denotes art objects. Art production can explain further similarities
between art objects, and looking into the rationality of engaging artistic production explains the
value of art as a branch on human endeavor. Theories of artistic production also allow and
explain the existence of bad art, which is a necessary part of a theory that does not equate art
with “high” art and its unjustifiable normativity. Ridding art theory of the bias of normative
dualism is, then, what we need to finally reach a successful description of art.
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